Although the official version of West New Guinea is somewhat "with nothing to say", the US/CIA documents tell a lot. Before we have further discussion, please remember two things:
Now, let's look at what was the US reaction after President Sukarno launched the military campaign. On the same day, Mr. Robert H. Johnson (the National Security Council Staff) wrote a letter to Mr. Bundy (President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs) and his letter reads as follows (see ref. ):
Some Fundamentals With Respect to West New Guinea
... (deleted by phs)... If the above analysis is correct, we must conclude that it is in our interests that a solution be devised which will lead to accesion of West New Guinea to Indonesia. ... (deleted by phs)... As the State paper says somewhat more cautiously - "basically, we recognize that for historical, geographical and political reasons West New Guinea probably will tend to closer, if not complete, association with Indonesia and our role in seeking a settlement will be to facilitate this evolution."
NIE 55-62 Washington, March 7,1962 The Prospects for Indonesia The Problem To analyze the major trends in Indonesia and to estimate pro- bable developments over the next year or so with special re- ference to Indonesia's international orientation and to the West New Guinea dispute. Conclusions 1. Until a settlement satisfactory to Sukarno is reached with the Netherlands, the West New Guinea dispute will continue to overshadow and strongly influence all other foreign and domestic issues in Indonesia. Sukarno will probably even closer to the (communist) Bloc position on major interna- tional issues as Indonesia continues to rely heavily on Soviet military aid and political support for the prosecu- tion of the West New Guinea campaign. The Indonesian Com- munist Party (PKI) will continue to exploit the issue and to obstruct a negotiated settlement. The diversion of army energies into the West New Guinea campaign will continue to hamper its efforts to reduce PKI strength and influence.. .. (deleted by phs)... 2. ... (deleted by phs)... In the event of a settlement, the army would probably give greater attention to countering PKI influence in the country. ... (deleted by phs)....As it can be seen above, the West New Guinea settlement had been made in advance by the USA as early as 1961 and even before the negotiations between the Dutch and Indonesian governments began on 20th March 1963. The US settlement was that West New Guinea should be a part of the Republic of Indonesia because:
It is also not surprising that the US representatives were very active
in the West New Guinea settlement and sponsored the negotiations
between the Dutch and Indonesian representatives carried out in Middleburg,
Virginia, on 20th March 1962. The talks were formally under the
auspices of the United Nations Secretary General (U Thant), but required
the third party as a mediator. It is also not surprising with the
previously mentioned US foreign policy, that the mediator was chosen to
be Mr. Ellsworth Bunker, a then-retired American diplomat (see ref.
It can be noticed a telegram from the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, to the US Embassy in Indonesia on March 6, 1962. The telegram reads as follows (see ref. ):
Washington, March 6, 1962, 8:57pm .... Secretary (of State, Dean Rusk) has asked Dutch consider following individuals for third party role: Ellsworth Bunker, Frederic Boland, Ernest Gross, Eugene Black, Walt Rostow, John McCloy, Hamilton Fish Armstrong. In our view Bunker would be particularly outstanding candidate. Request you see Sukarno or Subandrio soonest and pass on sub- stance this message including list of names suggested to Dutch. You should stress Secretary's view that Bunker would be absolutely first class. Believe with favorable Indo reaction this message we should be able firm up arrangements for secret talks get under way.
Now, we know that from the beginning USA had insisted Ellsworth Bunker to be the mediator. And, we know that the main task of Ellsworth Bunker during the West New Guinea negotiations was that he had to hand over West New Guinea to the Republic of Indonesia as soon as possible, regardless of Holland's position or even West New Guinea's position.